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NAMA as a Tool of De-industrialization of Africa 
M. Shafaeddin 
 
Abstract 
 
The author argues in this chapter that trade liberalization in Africa during the last couple 
of decades has led to de-industrialization, slow growth of GDP, low level of investment, 
growing trade deficits, particularly in food items, in many African countries. This has 
been the case despite some improvement in recent years due to increases in the price of 
primary commodities. Drawing also on the experience of successful industrializers as 
well as failures of premature trade liberalization in low-income countries in recent 
decades, he further refers to pitfalls in negotiations on NAMA in WTO against the 
interest of African countries. Discussing the proposals made by developed countries on 
NAMA, he argues that if they are agreed upon, the structure of production and exports of 
African countries would be locked in primary commodities, resource based activities and 
at best low-skill labour intensive products and assembly operation. Finally, he outlines 
conditions for industrialization of Africa and the required changes in international trade 
rules in a way to become conducive to growth and upgrading of the industrial activities of 
the continents.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the implications of the implementation of the 
proposals made by developed countries during the negotiations on Non-agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA), in WTO, on industrialization of Africa, particularly sub-
Saharan countries. These countries are characterized by low-level of development and 
industrialization and are already marginalized in international trade and the world 
economy. Further, they suffer from de-industrialization as a result of policies imposed on 
them by international financial institutions and bilateral donors under the influence of 
Neo-liberals and “Washington Consensus” the gist of which is summarized by 
Williamson (1990). 
 We will argue that if the proposals made by developed countries are agreed upon, 
they would limit the policy space of sub-Saharan countries damaging their process of 
industrialization and development further. It may, in fact, lock them in production and 
exports of primary commodities and at best resource-based products and assembly 
operations. Such an outcome will not only lead to their further marginalization, but would 
also have deteriorating effects on their food security.  
 To provide the background to our argument, we will briefly refer to the position 
of Africa in international trade and their development during recent decades. Section II is 
allocated to the explanation of the process and contents of NAMA negotiations and their 
implications for industrialization of African countries. In this respect, we will 
subsequently draw on historical evidence on trade and industrial policies of successful 
industrializers and the impacts of pre-mature trade liberalization on industrialization of 
developing countries during recent decades. 
 Let us mention here that the inclusion of this chapter in a collection of studies 
which deal with food security may seem misplaced in the first sight. Nevertheless, it is 
highly relevant because of the interrelation between the agricultural and the 
manufacturing sectors. The growing demand for food is to be satisfied by either domestic 
production of the food stuff, or by imports which has to be financed by foreign exchange 
provided by exports of raw materials and/or industrial products (the later example is 
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Singapore). The lack of availability of raw materials and their slow pace of their 
international demand requires some degree of industrial exports for many of the African 
countries, particularly the larger ones. Further, development of agriculture and the 
necessary infrastructure, particularly increases in yields, requires some degree of 
industrial development. Similarly, availability of foods, as wage goods, contributes to the 
development of competitive industrial development (Shafaeddin, 2005.b).  
 
II. Sub-Sahara’s position in world trade and the impact of trade liberalization 
 
In an earlier paper (Shafaeddin, 1996), we have shown that Africa’s position in 
international trade deteriorated considerably between 1950 and 1990, particularly in the 
case of Sub-Saharan countries. We also argued that the region would be marginalized 
further in international economy because of its low supply capabilities in the 
manufacturing industries, its difficulties in diversification of the production and export 
structures and the nature of globalization and international production networking. We 
will show in this section that since then, the region has been under pressure to liberalize 
foreign trade further; and many countries of the region have suffered from de-
industrialization and further marginalization from international trade.  
 Trade liberalization has been more drastic in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
countries, than in many other low income regions. The average unweighted tariffs rate of 
the continent for all products, which had declined to 21.7%in 1995, was reduced further 
to 13.1% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008.c:table1). Further, in 2006, nine African countries 
showed average tariff rates of less than 10% (based on Loc.cit). Sub-Saharan show even 
lower tariff rate than Africa as a whole; in the same year the unweighted and weighted 
tariff rates were 12.1% and 7.9%, respectively. These rates are also lower than the 
corresponding rates of 14.9 and 13.9 for South- Asia, and 12.7 and 12.4 per cent for all 
low-income countries, respectively (UNCTAD,2008.c:table1 and World Bank,2008:table 
6.7).The manufacturing sector was subject to more or less, the same degree of 
liberalization. For example the unweighted and weighted tariff rates for the manufacture 
products of Sub-Saharan countries were 11.9 and 8 per cent as against 12.3% and 12.1% 
for low-income countries as a whole (World Bank, Loc.cit.). Taking export-and import-
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GDP ratios as indicators of outward orientation of the economy, it is evident in table 1 
that African countries are more outward oriented not only as compared with developed 
countries, but also as compared with other low-income countries, particularly South-Asia. 
Inset tables 1 and 2 here 
 Trade liberalization has been accompanied with marginalization of Africa in 
world trade, mainly due to slow growth of production, thus exports of, the manufacture 
sector. Table 2 indicates significant decline in the share of Africa in world trade during 
1980-2000 before it improves slightly in more recent years. In particular, the share of 
African LDCs, which include 31countries with about 500 million people (or 7.4 per cent 
of total world population), 1remains extremely low. The slight improvement in the ratio 
over 2000-07 is basically due to the increase in price of primary commodities During 
2002-07, prices of fuel and other primary commodities increased by annual average rates 
of 23.3% and 16.3%, respectively,2. These two product groups accounted for 92 per cent 
of exports of African LDCs in 2005-06. The share of the whole of Africa in world 
exports of manufactured goods was about 0.72% in 2006; it was 0.27% for Sub-Sahara, 
excluding South Africa for 2003-63.  
 As we have mentioned already, the low share of the region in world trade is 
basically due to their low capacity in exports and production of manufactured goods 
which are among demand dynamic” products in international trade. The shares of 
manufactured goods in exports and GDP of African LDCs were 7.5 and 9.1% in 2005-64, 
respectively. The share of manufactured good exports in GDP is less than 10 per cent for 
the majority of African countries (table 3). 
Insert tables 3 and 4 here 
Considering that the countries of the region are at early stages of industrialization, one 
would expect based on experience of other countries (Chenery and Syrqin, 1985) that the 
share of MVA in their GDP should have increased during the last couple of decades. 
Nevertheless, taking the MVA/GDP ratio as an indicator of the degree of 
industrialization, table 4 indicates that the region has suffered from de-industrialization 
                                                 
1
 Based on UNCTAD (2008.a), tables 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.  
2
 Based on UNCTAD, Ibid, table 6.1 
3
 Based on Ibid ; table 2.2 and UNCTAD(2008.c), table 8, p.58.  
4
 Based on UNCTAD(2008.b), p.8, table 3 
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during the recent decades no matter how various countries are grouped as shown in table 
4. The degree of de-industrialization is even more pronounced if one compares the 
MVA/GDP ratio of recent years with that of 1970s. For the continent as a whole, the ratio 
declined from 21% for 1970-79 to 9% for 2000-06 (Sundaram and Arnim, 2008: table 7). 
The decline in the ratio is partly statistical because of the increase in price of fuel and 
other primary commodities. Nevertheless, the price increase can not explain the decline 
entirely; for the period 1990-99, when the price of petroleum and other commodities 
showed declining trend, the corresponding ratio was 12 as against 21 for 1970-795. For 
the particular case of African LDCs, the ratio declined from 10.7 in 1980 to 7.5 in 2006; 
also it fell in 19, out of 31 cases, and increased only in 12 cases (UNCTAD,2008.b: table 
A.5).  
 Generally speaking, the development performance of Sub-Shoran African 
countries, in particular, has not bee satisfactory following trade liberalization during the 
last quarter century. As is shown in table 5, during 1980s in particular even export growth 
(in current terms) was negative. Judged by growth of exports and GDP, economic 
performance has improved somewhat during 2000-06. Nevertheless, the improvement 
can not be attributed necessarily to trade liberalization. It is true that export growth is an 
important contributory factor to growth of GDP as it contributes to its growth directly and 
indirectly, through availability of foreign exchange necessary for investment and 
development. Nevertheless, the increase in the value of exports in more recent years was 
basically due to increase in price of non-fuel primary commodities, and petroleum which 
more than doubled and trebled  during 2002-2007 period6.In fact, the pace of MVA 
decelerated during 2000-2006 as indicated in the same table.  
Insert table 5 here 
 Moreover, trade liberalization contributed more to the expansion of imports than 
growth of exports. When oil exports are excluded, it is evident that trade liberalization 
was accompanied with increase in trade deficits of non-oil exporting African countries 
despite increase in the price of primary commodities in recent years. The trade deficits of 
                                                 
5
 The price index of primary commodities was 124.3 in 1990 as against 98.4 in 1999; for crude petroleum it 
was 78.1.6 and 64.3, respectively (Based on UNCTAD, 2008.a: table 6.1).  
 
6
 Based on Ibid. 
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these countries increased from $6.2 b. in 1979-81 to $35.1b for 1999-01 and nearly 
$60b.in 2005-7 which is equivalent of about a quarter of their import bill (Based on 
UNCTAD, 2008.a), tables 1.1.1 and 1.1.2).  
 The deficit in food trade of the African countries is, in particular alarming. The 
combination of their own trade liberalization together with agricultural policies of 
developed countries has had major knock-down effects on agricultural production of the 
continent. Thus food deficits of the continents increased from about $14b in 20002/3 to 
$38.7b in 2007/8 (UNCTAD 2008.c, P.38). In 2005, 24 African LDCs, out of 31, show 
food deficits, out of which in 18 cases the deficits increase significantly over 2000-06 
(based on UNCTAD, 2008.b:table 10).  
 Low level of investment has been another by product of liberalization as 
government expenditures were cut in many African countries under the pressure from 
Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Programmes of the World Bank and IMF. 
Further, the private investment did not particularly respond to trade liberalization and 
FDI has not been forthcoming much (Shafaeddin 2005.a and c and Sundaram and Armin, 
2008).Despite some improvement in recent years, the I/GDP ratio was lower in 2006 than 
that of 1980; the corresponding ratios were 20.7 % and 24%, respectively7.  
 In short, trade liberalization has not been accompanied with growth of industrial 
sector in most African countries. In fact, de-industrialization has occurred in many of 
these countries. And recent recovery in exports and GDP will be short lived as the 
upcoming world economic down turn will definitely lead to decline in price as well as 
volume of exports of primary commodities. There is already some evidence in this 
direction. The price of primary commodities has fallen, on average, by nearly 30 per cent 
between April, when it was at its peak, and end October 20088.  
 Taking into account the historical background during the last couple of decades, 
let us see what could be the possible impact of likely outcome of NAMA.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 It was 19.1 for 1990 and 17.4 for 2000 (UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics2002, table 7.3 and 
UNCTAD,2008.a. table 8.3.1.  
8
 Based on UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin online:  
(http://stats.unctad.org/CPB/tableviewer/document.aspx?FileId=252) 
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III. NAMA negotiation and its de-industrialization impact on Africa 
 
In this section we will first outline the stated objectives of the Doha Round regarding 
NAMA, before referring to the proposals made by developed countries during the 
negotiation in WTO. Subsequently, the implication of these proposals for 
industrialization of African countries will be discussed if they are agreed upon by the 
contracting parties of WTO. 
 
i. Stated objectives of the Doha Round regarding NAMA 
 
The proposals so far made by developed countries during the course of negotiation on 
NAMA are in full contrast with the stated objectives of the “Doha Development Round”. 
The agreed text of the Round clearly emphasizes the special need and interests of 
developing countries, particularly least developed countries9.Thus according to 
paragraphs 16 and 50 of the Declaration a number of principals would be followed during 
the curse of negotiation on NAMA, including: 
 Less than full reciprocity in tariff reduction commitments in favour of 
developing countries; 
 Special and differential treatment for developing and least developed 
countries as stated in part IV of the GATT 1994, etc.; 
 Reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as 
well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to 
developing countries. 
Para 3.b of Article XXVIIIbis (GATT 94) also clearly refers to “the needs of developing 
countries for more flexible [our italics] use of tariffs protection...” Further, the text of the 
July (2004) package again emphasizes the principles of “less than full reciprocity” and 
“flexibility” in favour of developing countries (e.g. paragraphs, 3, 4 and 8 of Annex B to 
                                                 
9
 For example, see paragraph 2 and article 6 of the declaration and reference to Article XXVIIIbis of 
GATT 1994, and para8 of Article XXXVI, part IV, GATT 1994).  
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the text of the July 2004 Package)10. Flexibility would allow a percentage of tariff lines 
deviate from the full extent of the formula cuts or be exempted from them. In addition, 
Para 94 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration refers to proportionality, or balance 
between ambition levels between NAMA and Agricultural market access. The latter also 
implies that the principals applied to NAMA should be consistence with those applied to 
Agriculture.  
 
ii. The position of developed countries during the course of negotiation 
 
In practice, however, the proposals made by developed countries during the negotiation 
on NAMA are neither consistent with those principles nor conducive to industrialization 
and development of developing countries.  
 In fact, right after the conclusion of the Doha Declaration, developed countries 
deviated from the objectives of the Doha Round by making proposals, contained in the 
Annex B of the July 2004 text, against the interests of developing countries. This Annex 
contained elements of less than full reciprocity and Special and differential treatments in 
favour of developed countries rather than developing countries. It was pushed through by 
the chairman of the negotiating group to be sent to the General Council despite the 
opposition by developing countries. The contents of Annex B was, in effect, legally 
nullified by the paragraph 1 of the Annex which regarded them as issues for further 
negotiations rather than agreed decisions (Das, 2005:29-30). Nevertheless,  developed 
countries have continued, more or less, on the basis of their original proposals contained 
in the remaining articles of Annex B (Articles 2-17), until the collapse of the talks in July 
2008. Between July 2004 and July 2008 a number of new “chairman texts” have been 
issued but the content of none of them has been development oriented11. Let us explain 
these issues in slightly more details.  
 Developed countries have been pushing for across-the-board liberalization of 
trade in manufactured goods by applying the (non-linear) Swiss Formula for cutting and 
                                                 
10
  See Khor, M. and Yen, G.C. (2005) for details. 
 
11
  Since then the Chairman presented new texts in July 2007,and in the texts of  8  and 28 February 2008, 
18 May and July 2008. Further, Mr Lamy, the Director-General of WTO, presented his own text on 25 July 
2008 before the talks collapsed once again.  
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bounding individual tariff lines at low level, by limiting flexibility and requesting “anti-
concentration” in tariff cuts and by asking for compulsory “sectoral initiatives”. They 
have often ignored the views expressed by delegations of developing countries, to the 
extent that certain clauses were inserted in the draft negotiating texts presented by the 
chairman of the NAMA without much prior discussion. Further, the use of time pressure, 
threats, bulling and blame games have been among tactics used by developed countries 
during the negotiations.   
  
iii. The implications of the Swiss Formula 
 
The Swiss formula proposed in July 2004 text and used for negotiation for tariff cuts, 
despite the reluctance of developing countries, is a non-linear formula as follows: 
 T= (a. t)/ (a+t) and  
 R=t/ (a+t)  
where “T” and “t” and “a” are the new and initial tariff rates and constant coefficient, 
respectively, and R is the rate of tariff reduction.  
 This complicated formula has a few main characteristics which are inimical to 
industrialization of developing countries, particularly those at early stages of 
industrialization. 
•  the coefficient (e.g. 15), determines the maximum tariff rate possible under the 
formula irrespective of the country’s present tariff rates and its level of 
industrialization, 
• the lower the coefficient, the higher will be the rate of reduction in tariff, 
•  for a given coefficient, the higher the initial tariff rate, the higher the rate of 
reduction in tariff, 
•  for high tariff rates the rate of reduction in tariffs is higher than when a simple 
linear formula is applied (in which case the same percentage reduction is applied 
to all tariff lines.  
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• in a certain range of low tariff rates, the formula will lead to lower rates of 
percentage reduction than those generated by a tariff-independent linear 
reduction12. 
 According to the initial proposals made by developed countries, all countries were 
supposed to apply the same (Swiss) formula to cut average tariffs rates drastically and 
reduce their dispersion by binding 95 per cent of their all individual tariff13 lines at the 
same rate at low levels. For example, the USA proposed that developing countries cut 
tariffs to 8 per cent by 2010 and reduce them to zero by 2015. Certain sectors were 
proposed to be subject to zero tariffs immediately upon the conclusion of the Doha 
Round. The EU proposed non-linear cuts in tariffs according to the Swiss formula and a 
low and uniform coefficient of 10 chosen for both developed and developing countries. 
Their proposal following the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting (2005) was to apply 
coefficients of 15 for developing and 10 for developed countries, receptively. With 
coefficient of 10 for developed countries, a tariff rate of 5 per cent will be reduced to 3.33 
per cent-a reduction of 33 percent, but only 1.67 percentage point. By contrast, a 
coefficient of 15 per cent for developing countries will lead to the reduction of a tariff 
rate of 50 per cent to 11.5 per cent, or a reduction of 38.5 percentages. It is clear that the 
choice of the formula as well as its coefficients would results in less than full reciprocity 
in tariff cuts in favour of developed, not developing countries.  
Since July2004, new coefficients have been proposed, but still remain biased 
against developing countries. In the July 2007, the chairman proposed the coefficient of 
8-9 for developed countries and 19-23 for developing countries. The tariff cuts were to be 
implemented in 5 years and 9 years by developed and developing countries, respectively.  
iv. Trade-off between the coefficient and Flexibility in tariff cuts  
Further, according to the text of draft modalities of July 2007, allowing higher 
coefficients (lower tariff cuts) to developing countries required the trade-off with 
                                                 
12
  For details see Shafaeddin (2006.b). It is also proposed that at least 95 per cent of their individual tariff 
lines be bound.  
13
  Five per cent of tariff line can be excepted provided the related imports do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total value of member’s imports (para 8, annex B of the WTO July 2004 Package). 
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flexibilities in tariff reduction and binding. In other words, the number of tariff lines 
sheltered from formula cuts could be a positive function of percentage of formula cuts on 
those line; the higher the cut (the lower the coefficient), the higher the flexibility (the 
higher could be the number of tariffs lines exempted from full formula cuts). 
Accordingly, with coefficients of 19-23, 5% of tariff lines can be left unbound provided 
they do not represent more than 5% of imports of non-agricultural products of the 
country. Alternatively, 10% of tariff lines can be exempted from half formula cut 
provided they do not represent more than 10% of their manufactured imports. Countries 
which are prepared not to use any flexibility can apply higher coefficient of 22-26 i.e. 3 
points higher than otherwise required (19-23)14. 
 Developed countries criticized the July 2007 text on the ground that developing 
countries are requested to cut tariffs little!! Developing countries, on their part, requested 
a minimum of 25 points difference in the coefficients applied to them and to developed 
countries. They also requested significant flexibilities in tariff cuts. Their views were 
ignored in the subsequent chairman’s draft texts, including his July 2008 text and finally 
in Mr. Lamy’s draft of 25 July 2008 before the talks collapsed. 
 Subsequently, Mr. Lammy, the head of the WTO secretariat, also acted also as a 
chairman of TNC (Trade Negotiating Committee), in proposing a package consisting of 
coefficients of 8 for developed countries and an option of 20, 22 and 25 for developing 
countries. These coefficients were only the mid points of those proposed by the chair in 
his July 2008 text. The flexibilities in tariff cuts would vary depending on the coefficient 
used: 
 for the coefficient  25,there would be no exemption to cutting tariff lines,  
 for coefficient 20 it would contain two alternatives: exemption of 14 per 
cent, or 6.5% of tariff lines from full formula cuts, provided they would 
not represent more than 16 per cent, or 7.5%of imports of manufactured 
goods, respectively 
                                                 
14
 For details see South Centre (2007), particularly pp 30-34.  
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 for coefficient 22, 10% of tariff lines would be exempted from tariff cuts 
provided they would not represent more than 5% of imports of 
manufactured good.  
The difference between coefficients of 25 and 20 is not significant. Taking into account 
the average tariff rate of 30 per cent for developing countries, their new tariff rate would 
be 13.6% and 12%, respectively; they would lead to 54 % (or 16.4 percentage point) and 
60% (or 18 percentage point) cut in tariff rates of developing countries, respectively . By 
contrast, the coefficient of 8 would lead to a reduction in simple average tariffs of 
developed countries from about 3.7% to 2.5% by about 31% (or only 1.2 percentage 
points)15. The comparison of these calculations reveals that the outcome is again 
absolutely the reverse of the less than full reciprocity for developing countries. It 
basically leads to enhanced market access for developed countries.  
 It is interesting to note that in defiance of the agreed rules of GATT, the chair 
claimed that there had never been “agreed definition of reciprocity”. The notion of 
reciprocity and less than full reciprocity in treating developing countries is, however, 
clear in the Decision of 28 November 1979 of GATT (see Appendix A). 
v. Anti-concentration and sectoral issues  
 Further, Mr. Lamy’s proposals also limited flexibilities further by linking 
flexibilities (and coefficients) to the so-called “anti-concentration” clause and “sectoral 
initiative” which were initially introduced by the chairman in his July 2008 text. 
According to anti-concentration clause, developing countries must not exclude from any 
formula cuts a whole sector or a proportion of tariff lines in a sector beyond a certain 
level. For example, it is proposed that 20 % of tariff lines with at least 9% of total import 
value in any sector (or HS chapter) must be subject to full formula cuts. The implication 
of this clause is that various parts and components necessary for development and 
upgrading of an infant industry can not be protected against imports. While at the 
                                                 
15
 Taking into account the average tariff rates of 3.9,3.2 and 2.3 for the EU, the USA and Japan, 
respectively, it corresponds to 33% (1.3 percentage points) for EU; 29% (1 percentage point) for the USA 
and 22% (1.6 percentage point) for Japan. 
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beginning of industrialization, duty free imports of parts and components are necessary, 
the increase in domestic value added is important as time passes. Such development 
requires flexible and dynamic trade policy (see below). 
 The sectoral initiative, was supposed to be non mandatory; it means contracting 
parties should voluntarily reduce tariffs in some sectors to zero or near zero. In practice, 
in the 18 may draft modalities introduced by the chair of NAMA, the sectoral initiative 
was linked to flexibilities. In other words, to acquire extra flexibility (or a higher 
coefficient); a country ought to participate in sectoral initiative. 
Hence, the Swiss formula with a low coefficient fits the interests of the developed 
countries, while it goes against the interests of developing countries, particularly those 
which are at early stages of industrialization. Developing countries would be subject to 
significantly greater reduction in their tariff rates in terms of percentage as well as 
percentage points. Even with the latest coefficients and flexibilities proposed By Mr. 
Lamy, the policy space of developing countries will be limited, there will be less than full 
reciprocity and special and different treatment in favour of developed countries. It is true 
that the initial tariffs of developed countries are much lower than those of developing 
countries, but developing countries do need higher tariffs on industrial products as will be 
mentioned shortly.  
vi. Exceptional clauses for LDCs 
The July (2004) package provides some exceptional clauses and extra flexibilities for 
least developed, small and vulnerable economies and recently acceded countries in 
applying tariff cuts and binding. However, they are insufficient, for providing them 
policy space for industrial development. Some of the proposals in fact limit their policy 
space. Regarding Least developed countries, according to paragraph 45 of the July (2004) 
package and as well as para 9 of its annex B on NAMA framework exempt them from 
applying the formula cut and from reducing tariffs or participate in sectoral approach. But 
they are expected to substantially increase their tariff binding commitments. The Hong 
Kong Ministerial meeting (para 18) and the July 2007 text confirmed this proposition; 
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developed countries also offered them free market access to at least 97% of all their tariff 
lines. In the Hong-Kong meeting they were promised simplification of the Rules of 
Origin which applies to trade preferential schemes. They were also exempted, on 
temporary basis, from obligations in the TRIM agreement by allowing them to maintain 
the existing measures, which deviate from the obligations under the TRIM Agreement, 
for 7 year and from any new measures they may introduce for 5 years. This transition 
period may be extended (WTO, 2005; Annex F). 
 Nevertheless, first of all, exemption from tariff reduction would not apply to 
countries which are members of a Custom Union (e.g. Lesotho, Anogola, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania). Secondly, the binding of tariff at a low level would reduce their policy 
space and flexibility in changing their individual tariff rates for different groups of 
product (consumer good, intermediate goods and capital goods). Such a dynamic and 
flexible tariff structure is necessary for upgrading of their industrial. As is exemplified in 
table 6 different industries require different tariff rates in different phases of 
industrialization depending on their degree technology intensity. 
Insert table 6 here 
 Thirdly, provision of duty free access to 97% of tariff lines allows importing 
developed countries to continue imposing tariffs on about 300 products. As least 
developed countries usually have concentrated export structure of manufactured goods 
around 10 tariff lines or so, in essence they may not be able to benefit from that 
exemption (South Centre, 2007: 22).  
 Fourthly, the idea of simplification and improvement in transparency in the Rule 
of Origin, which is often an obstacle to expansion of exports of manufactured goods from 
least developed countries, has not been taken up. 
 Finally, considering that the process of industrialization is pretty long, 5, or even 
7 year, exemption from obligations related to the TRIM agreement is too short and their 
prolongation is not certain in order to provide incentives to investors to invest in activities 
with long or medium gestation period.   
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Hence, the exceptional provisions provided to LDCs are not sufficient to satisfy 
the needs of these countries for industrialization or upgrading of their industrial base 
vii. Other tactics used by developed countries 
Arbitrary insertion of some issues in the draft modalities, by the chairman of the 
NAMA negotiating committee, threat, bulling and blaming have been other tactics used 
by developed counties during the negotiations. For example, the views expressed by the 
chairman in various draft modalities (e.g. July 2007 text and 8 February and 28 February 
2008 texts) were attributed to the majority of members. Yet, developing countries did not 
confirm this proposition and regarded some of issues included in his texts arbitrary as 
they had been hardly discussed in the formal meeting. Hence, they were regarded as 
“coffee shop” proposals.  
An example of threat and bullying is that made during the course of negotiation in 
July 2008 when anti-concentration and sectoral initiative were introduced and discussed. 
The US and EU representatives threatened that unless these issues were accepted by 
developing countries as drafted by the chairman, they would not agree to opening the 
brackets in the text on other issues on which progress had already been made16.  Another 
example is their threat that without successful NAMA outcome, there would be no 
reduction in agricultural subsidies, no liberalization in services, no advance in trade 
facilitation, and no development round17. 
Finally, while developed countries did not show much flexibility during the 
negotiation, each time the negotiation was interrupted, they blamed a number of 
developing countries engaged in small-group discussions. Further, while developed 
countries insisted on limiting flexibilities in tariff cuts in negotiation on NAMA, they 
requested far greater flexibilities in tariff reduction as well as subsidies in the course of 
negotiation for liberalization of trade in agriculture. 
                                                 
16
  See “Divisive issues throw shadow over NAMA state of play” in the SUNS (South-North Development 
Monitor), 9 July 2008. 
 
17
 Ibid, 30 May 2008. See also zeroing in previous pages.  
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IV. Implications for industrialization 
The application of the proposed coefficients, limited flexibilities suggested by 
developed countries, and insufficient exceptional clauses for least developed countries 
will have a significant detrimental long-term effect on industrialization of African and 
other developing countries which are at early stages of industrializations. They have by 
contrast no negative effects on developed countries. Developed countries are already 
industrialized; they have the supply capacity to produce capital-intensive, skill-intensive 
and technology-intensive goods. By giving up some-in fact in this case small - trade 
barriers on imports in exchange for market access in developing countries, developed 
countries do not sacrifice their long-run industrial development. Of course, their 
upgrading of the industrial sector depends on the development of new technology. But 
they have firmly secured protection of their new technologies through the WTO's TRIPS 
Agreement as mentioned in the previous pages. 
By contrast, the industrial sector of African, and other low-income, countries is, 
unlike that of developed countries, underdeveloped, and the use of tariffs is almost their 
only remaining trade policy instrument. They need to apply higher tariffs to some of their 
industries, particularly newly established ones. The low and bound tariffs rates will 
disarm them of an important policy tool for establishing new industries and upgrading the 
existing ones. Clearly, if they obtain further market access in developed countries, they 
will improve their prospects for expanding exports of products produced by their existing 
efficient industries, i.e. industries in which they have static comparative advantages. But 
binding tariffs at low levels deprives them of the tool of diversification and expansion of 
supply capacity in new industries in which they may wish to develop dynamic 
comparative advantage. Therefore, even if market access is provided for such potential 
products, the prospects for their supply expansion will be absent due to the lack of their 
policy space. In other words, for the sake of better access to markets for their current 
export products, they sacrifice the ability to establish new industries or diversify their 
production structure away from primary commodities or upgrade their manufacturing 
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sector into new products. Such a trade-off will result in deepening of their static 
comparative advantage. It may, in fact, lock them in production of resource based and at 
most simple labour intensive industries and assembly operations.  
 Professor Wade correctly argues that “International rules should be judged against 
how they assist or hinder production diversification” (Wade2006: 8), not specialization 
according to static comparative advantage. Otherwise, whatever efficiency is gained due 
to liberalization will be at the cost of growth and diversification in the long-run. He is 
also correct to say that WTO rules makes the “creative function” of the markets more 
difficult by hindering diversification and upgrading of the production structure in 
developing countries; but they encourage industrial upgrading in industrialized countries 
as they “permit industrial policy activism of the kind needed to nurture ‘knowledge-
intensive’ industries and activities which prevail in developed countries! (Wade 2006: 8-
9).  The protection of technology intensive industries through TRIPs is a clear example of 
such encouragement as mentioned earlier. 
 Before ending this section, note that applying the CGE models in their 
simulations exercises, the neo-liberals conclude that developing countries are the major 
winner of the simulated Doha scenarios (e.g. Bouet et.al, 2007). These models, however, 
are based on restrictive and unrealistic assumptions and static comparative advantage 
theory disregarding the need for supply capacity building in accordance with the principle 
of dynamic comparative advantage (Shafaeddin 2005.b). 
V. Lessons from History 
The experience of successful industrializers and premature liberalization in 
colonies, and in developing countries in more recent years, provide us with lessons from 
history indicating that premature liberalization will lead to de-industrialization 
(Shafaeddin (2005.a and 2006.a) 18.The experience of successful early and late 
industrializers indicates first of all that with the exception of Hong Kong, no country has 
managed to industrialize without going through the infant industry protection phase, 
                                                 
18
  The following paragraphs are based on Shafaeddin (2006.a). See also Wade (2007). 
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although across-the-board import substitution and prolonged protection have also led to 
inefficiency and failure 
Secondly, government intervention, both functional and selective, in the flow of 
trade and in the economy in general has played a crucial role in the process of 
industrialization. In all cases, including Great Britain, industrialization began on a 
selective basis, although to a different degree, and continued in the same manner until the 
industrial sector was consolidated. 
 Thirdly, when their industries matured industrialized countries began to liberalize 
selectively and gradually. Therefore, trade liberalization is beneficial after an industry 
reaches a certain level of maturity provided it is done gradually and selectively. In 
contrast, premature trade liberalization, whether by early industrializers, by colonies 
during the colonial era, or by developing countries in more recent decades, has had 
disappointing results. For example, when the USA tried to liberalize pre-maturely in 
1847-61, the industrial sector suffered and the country had to revert to protectionism 
against imports from Great Britain. 
 Fourthly, government intervention was not confined to trade; the state intervened 
through other means, directly and indirectly, in particular to promote investment and to 
develop the necessary institutions and infrastructure. Industrialization was also supported 
by attention to and growth in agricultural production. Hence, the issue is not the lack of 
intervention, but the nature and the efficiency of government intervention. 
 Fifthly, while different countries did not follow exactly the same path, all learned 
from the experience of others; the USA learned from Great Britain, Germany from the 
USA, Japan from Germany and the Republic of Korea from Japan, etc. 
 Sixthly, all main early industrializers tried to open the markets in other countries 
when their industrial sector matured. In the 19th century, free trade policy was forced on 
the colonies and the 5 per cent rule (according to which 5 per cent was the maximum 
tariff rate allowed on any import item) was imposed on semi-colonies and independent 
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countries through "unequal" bilateral treaties and/or through force (for example, in China, 
after the opium war of 1839-42). 
 Further, the policy space of the colonies, in the 19th century, was further limited 
by England by outlawing high value-added manufacturing activities in the colonies and 
banning the export of competing items from colonies to England (Chang2005.b). Instead, 
production of primary products was instituted and promoted. The outcome of the 
imposition of pre-mature trade liberalization on the colonies was devastation and led to 
de-industrialization. For example over 90 per cent of textiles industries of India were 
destroyed as a result of liberalization by the colonial power. 
Recent experience 
 During recent decades, African and many other developing countries have been 
pushed through multilateral organizations, bilateral trade agreements and donors to open 
their markets. In addition, tariff peaks and escalation and arbitrary anti-dumping 
measures have been among the means of restricting imports of high-value added products 
from developing countries. The results of a study, by the author, of about 50 developing 
countries which have undertaken trade liberalization during the 1990s indicates that with 
the exception of East Asia, their trade liberalization has had three main features which are 
common with the proposals of developed countries in NAMA negotiations:  
• Premature and rapid liberalization. 
• Uniformity: i.e. a tendency toward uniform tariff rates for various industries in 
each country;  
• Universality, i.e. application of the same recipe to all countries irrespective of 
their level of industrialization and development;  
The results of this kind of liberalization have been disappointing for most of the 
countries other than those in East Asia. Firstly, only 20 countries, or 40% of the sample, 
have shown high (more than 10% a year) rate of growth of exports of manufactured 
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goods. And of these, only in about 10 countries (mostly in East Asia) were high growth 
rates of exports accompanied with increasing or high growth rates of Manufacturing 
Value Added (MVA). MVA is a more important indicator of performance than export, as 
it measures the net output or income accruing to the country, whereas a rise in exports 
could also be accompanied by a corresponding or even higher rise in imports (including 
inputs that are used in the production of exports).  
Secondly, and more importantly, in fact, in half of the sample countries de-
industrialization took place over 1980-2000. The MVA/GDP ratio declined without 
recovering to its initial level. In many countries industrial employment also suffered 
severely. 
Thirdly, when exports expanded, this growth was mainly in resource-based industries 
and some assembly operation without much upgrading, except for industries which were 
dynamic during the import-substitution era and were near the stage of maturity, or which 
continued to benefit from some sort of support from the government. The aerospace 
industry of Brazil is a good example of an industry which was near the stage of maturity 
and benefited from trade liberalization.  
 Fourthly, even though the relative incentives changed in favour of exports, the 
manufacturing industry suffered from low investment despite a significant increase in 
foreign direct investment in some cases (for example, Brazil). Investment in 
manufacturing suffered because the balance of risk and return turned against the 
manufacturing sector (Shafaeddin, 2006.b). 
 The brief review of development in Africa presented in section II of this paper is 
consistent with the results of the survey summarized above19. In the case of countries 
which are at early stages of industrialization and development, different industries require 
different rates of protection and different lengths of time for their development as 
mentioned earlier. This is because there are differences in risks and scales of production 
involved in different industries which also need different length of time and experience 
                                                 
19
 See also Easterly (2001 and 2002). 
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for their technological upgrading. Further, uniform tariff rates provide different effective 
rates of protection for various industries, depending on their import intensity. For given 
uniform rates for output and inputs, the higher the import intensity, the lower the 
effective rate of protection. As a result uniform rates involve biases against new 
industries as new industries usually have high import intensity. This explains why 
assembly operations do not easily lead to increases in value added as shown in the case of 
Mexico (Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2008). 
 In short, if agreed upon, proposals made by developed countries on NAMA, 
would lock the structure of production and exports of African countries into primary 
commodities, simple resource-based and labour intensive products and at most assembly 
operations.  
     VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have shown in this chapter that African countries, particularly Sub-Saharan countries 
have become increasingly marginalized from international trade and the world economy 
during the last couple of decades following considerable trade liberalization and increases 
in their openness. While their X/GDP and M/GDP share has increased to a level higher 
than low-income countries as a whole, trade liberalization has been accompanied by de-
industrialization in many African countries. Moreover, the private investment has not 
been stimulated as neo-liberals expected. In 2006, the investment/GDP ratio was lower 
than that of 1980 despite some improvement in recent years due to availability of foreign 
exchange as a result of increases in price of primary commodities. Further, GDP growth 
has been slow and trade liberalization has led to increases in trade deficits, including 
deficits in food trade, as imports increased faster than exports. As a result, dependence on 
external factor has increased considerably while poverty is widespread. 
 Under these conditions, developed countries have been  pushing African, and 
other developing countries, to cut tariffs on their industrial goods substantially and reduce 
their restrictions on activities of multinationals in exchange mainly for a slight cut in their 
tariffs on industrial goods and in their domestic supports for agriculture. Although some 
exceptions are proposed to least developed countries, they are insufficient to prevent their 
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lose of policy autonomy, particularly if they bind their individual tariffs lines at low 
levels.  
 Drawing on the lessons of historical experience, we have argued that as African 
countries lose their policy space necessary for development of their industries in 
accordance with the principal of “dynamic comparative advantage”, their structure of 
production and exports will be locked in primary commodities, resource based industries 
and at best low-skill labour intensive activities and assembly operations.  Of course, they 
may gain some market access for products for which they have static comparative 
advantage. But such gains would be at the cost of slow growth and lack of diversification 
of their production structure and development in the long-run.  
 What is more damaging than NAMA is conditions which EU is trying to impose 
on African, and other members of ACP, countries under EPA(Economic Partnership 
Agreement)-although we did not discuss it here (see e.g. Oxfam,2008.) 
 What is needed for developing and industrialization in accordance with the 
principle of dynamic comparative advantage (Cline1983, Amsden1989, Gomery and 
Baumol, 2000, Wade, 2005 and Shafaeddin 2005.b), is first of all that African countries 
should have a clear concept of their industrial development strategy and trade policy 
before entering into negotiation in WTO or other forums. This is a necessary condition. 
However, it should be emphasized that any intervention might not serve the purpose of 
diversification and upgrading. For this purpose the decision making capacity of the 
government should improve to enhance the efficiency of its policy making mechanism. 
While a country may learn from the experience of others, it can not copy them; each 
country has its own characteristics which may be different from others to some extent. 
Thus development of government capacity in policy making is an essential factor.  
 The sufficient condition is that the rules of the World Trading System should be 
changed in a way that it would be conducive to industrial development of developing 
countries by allowing a dynamic and flexible trade policy with dimensions of space and 
time. Such a framework of international trade rules should20 accommodate countries with 
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 For details see Shafaeddin (2005.b), and Wade (2006):10-13. 
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different levels of industrialization and development at each point in time, therefore 
allowing “Special and Differential Treatment” as a rule not as an exception. Therefore, 
the concept of “less than full reciprocity” should be taken more seriously as countries are 
at different levels of development and have different needs. Change in trade policy 
should be allowed in each country as the country develops; hence a country should be 
allowed the necessary policy space for both selective infant industry protection and 
gradual and selective liberalization, when an industry reaches near maturity. For 
liberalization of the tariff structure, flexibility would dictate that only average tariffs 
(which may be even higher than the current average rate) are bound with significant 
dispersion (Akuz 2005). The trade rules should also permit the use of export performance 
requirements by African and other developing countries in TRIMS. Easier transfer of 
technology to African, and other developing countries which are at early stages of 
development, should be permitted by changing TRIPS Agreement and revising Subsidy 
and Countervailing Measures Agreement and GATS to provide more policy space 
particularly for low-income developing countries. 
 Of course, such a re-conceptualization of the trading system will not take place 
over night, but it eventually need to happen (Helleiner, 2005). Recent development in 
international financial market is a clear indication of over reliance on market forces even 
in developed countries, let alone countries at early stages of development. The 
international community should not wait for facing a human disaster in Africa and other 
low-income countries before acting to change international trade rules. 
 
Appendix A: 
The Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More  
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of developing Countries. 
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of developing 
countries, i.e. the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the 
course of negotiations to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not 
seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions 
that are inconsistent with the latter’s development, financial and trade needs. 
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Text tables 
 
Table 1: The trade/GDP ratio of Africa and other groups of counties (2006) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Region     X  M  (X+M) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All Africa    38.2  32.1  70.3 
North Africa    43.3  31.3  74.6 
North Africa ex. Sudan  44.8  32.0  76.8 
Major African petroleum exporters 51.2  26.3  77.5 
African least developed countries 38.2  36.2  74.4 
Sub-Saharan African countriesa 34.8 (35) 32.2(36) 67.0(71) 
Sub-Sahara ex. South Africa  38.1  32.7  70.8 
Low-income developing countries 27  30  57 
South Asia    22  26  48.0 
Developed countries   26  27.5  53.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.a) table 8.3.2 except the figures in brackets and those 
for South Asia and Low-income countries which are based on World Bank ( 2008), table 
4.8. 
a. Includes Haiti except for the figures in the brackets.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage share of Africa in world trade, 1980-2007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1980  1990  2000  2007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Exports:     
Total Africa    5.86  3.08  2.37  2.87 
Sub-Sahara, excluding South Africa 2.46  1.23  1.09  1.34 
African LDCsa   0.6  0.46  0.33  0.66 
Non-oil exporting Africab  2.55  1.67  1.18  1.30 
 
Imports:      
Total Africa    4.52  2.70  1.96  2.43 
Sub-Sahara, excluding South Africa 2.12  0.96  0.80  1.03 
African LDCsa   1.15  0.69  0.66  .82 
Non-oil exporting Africab  2.68  2.02  1.53  1.78 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: UNCTAD(2008.a), tables 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 
a. Includes Haiti   b. Excluding major petroleum exporters.  
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Table 3: The percentage share of exports of manufactured goods in GDP of African 
countries (2000-06) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share in total exports  No. of countries  % of total 
       Each group     Cumulative   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Less than, or equal to 1  9   25.7  25.7 
1-2     6   17.1  42.8 
2-5     8   22.9  65.7 
5-10     5   14.2  80 
10-15     2   7.7  87.7 
Greater than 15a   5   14.3  100 
Total     35   100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: calculated by the author based on UNCTAD(2008.c), table 7 and pp-55-56.  
a: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland and Tunisia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The percentage share of MVA in GDP of Africaa (1990-2006) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year  All S-S S-S  N.A. LDCsb  petroleum  
    ex.SA     exporters 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1990  16.5 17.8 15.1  13.5 9.7  12.2 
2000  13 12.8 9.4  12.9 7.7  10.1 
2006  11.6 11.5 7.7  11.5 7.5  9.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Based on UNCTAD (2008.a) and UNCTAD, Handbook, data online, Table 
8.3.1 and 8.3.2 and UNCTAD82008.b),Appendix table 5 
 
a: all variables are in current terms 
b: 10.7 for 1980. 
 
Notations: S-S: Sub-Saharan African countries; N.A.: North Africa 
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Table 5 : Indicators of Economic performance of Sub-Saharan countries (1980-2006)a 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  GDP  GDP.  MVA    Investment Export 
    Per capita     value  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1980-90 2.1  -0.8  1.7  -3.8  -0.9 
1990-2000 2.7  -0.1  4.7  4.5  4.3 
2000-06 4.9  2.4  3.4  7.6  15.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources : Based on UNCTA(2008.b)table A.5 and (2008.a), tables 1and 8. 
All variables are in constant prices except exports which are in current terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Evolution of average tariffs for various groups of 
industries at different phases of industrialization 
 
Phase RB&LI LT MT HT Manufactures 
(Average) 
I 20 0 0 0 5 
II 10 40 0 0 12.5 
III 0 30 50 0 20 
IV 0 20 40 40 25 
V 0 10 30 40 20 
VI 0 0 15 25 10 
VII 0 0 5 15 5 
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Akyüz (2005: 27). 
 
Notations: 
RB: Resource-based industries 
LI: Labour-intensive industries 
LT: Low-technology-intensive industries 
MT: Medium-technology-intensive industries 
HT: High-technology-intensive industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
